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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
that the Section 1983 federal remedy is simply independent of the
available state remedies. I think it is becoming more and more
important to pay attention to the relationship between the Section
1983 remedies and the state remedies. Thank you very much.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Let me start where you ended up. I do not feel that the
prisoner case171 is an exhaustion situation. I agree with you that
we have got to pay more attention to the interrelationship between
state and federal proceedings, but is not this prisoner thing more
like a condition precedent to having a claim? If you have not got
the disciplinary sanction vacated, nothing wrong has been done to
you that the federal court or Section 1983 is interested in
correcting.
Professor Schwartz:
Well, in some technical way you are right. In Heck v.
Humphrey,17 the Supreme Court said that these Section 1983
17 See Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997). A state prisoner alleged
a violation of due process under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 resulting from a
deprivation of good time credits. Id. at 1585. The Supreme Court held that a
claim challenging the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing is not always
cognizable under § 1983, and in this case was not cognizable. Id. at 1589.
17 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Petitioner filed suit seeking damages only under 42
U.S.C.A.§ 1983, claiming that respondents "under the color of state law,
engaged in unlawful acts that led to his arrest and conviction." Id at 479. The
federal district court dismissed without prejudice. Id. The court of appeals
affirmed, reiterating the holding of the lower court that
[i]f the plaintiff in a federal civil rights action is challenging the
legality of his conviction, so that the victory would require his relief
even if he had not sought that relief, the suit must be classified as a
habeas corpus action and dismissed if the plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his state remedies.
Id. at 477.
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that "this Court has long expressed
similar concerns for finality and consistency [of final judgments] and has
generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack." Id. at 484-
85. Further, the Court stated "[e]ven a prisoner who has flly exhausted state
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claims are simply not cognizable.'" That is true in Edwards v.
Balisok'74 as well."" But, if you say that they are not cognizable
unless a certain condition is first shown to exist, what is that
condition? With regard to getting the conviction or the
disciplinary sanction overturned, if you start from the premise
that it is not likely to be overturned by executive order, when
then is it likely to be overturned? By state appeal or by state
habeas corpus proceeding.
I think that, realistically, this is a type of exhaustion
requirement. In fact, it is probably worse than an exhaustion
requirement. At least with an exhaustion requirement an
individual goes through whatever administrative or other state
remedies that are available, and exhaustion requirements have
been satisfied. Now the individual can file the Section 1983
claim. Under Heck v. Humphrey76 and Edwards v. Balisok'", I
think that there are a large number of claims where the
individual, either one who has been convicted or one who faces a
disciplinary sanction, may have suffered a federal constitutional
violation that might never be cognizable because of an inability to
get the conviction or disciplinary sanction overturned. What I am
saying is that, in substance, it is a type of exhaustion rule.
Maybe your point is that, in some ways, it is even more onerous
than exhaustion requirements.
remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or
sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a
writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 489.
173Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994).
174 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997).
175Id. at 1589.
176 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
177 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997). Respondent lost 30 days of good time credit for
violating prison rules. Id. at 1585. Respondent brought suit, alleging a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Id. The Court held that the respondent's claim was not cognizable
under § 1983, and reversed the lower court's ruling. Id. at 1585-86.
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I agree with the latter. You made a couple of interesting points
in terms of what the Supreme Court requires other people to do
and what it does itself. In the Richardson" case, the private
prison guards asked whether they have qualified immunity or
not.179 The Court said that it would assume that there was state
actionO and proceeded to decide the qualified immunity issue."'
In Siegert v. Gilley,' the Supreme Court took the D.C. Circuit to
task for doing exactly the same thing." ' It said that you cannot
17 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997). Respondent brought a federal tort action against
Petitioners, two prison guards, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 2102.
Petitioners moved to dismiss, claiming qualified immunity. Id. The district
court denied the motion, noting that Tennessee had privatized the correctional
facility in question, and the law did not afford these guards qualified
immunity. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, as did the Supreme Court. Id.
at 2103.
179 Id. at 2102.
180 Id.
" Id. at 2109 (finding "no special immunity-related need to encourage
vigorous performance.").
1' 500 U.S. 226 (1990). Petitioner was a clinical psychologist employed at a
federal government facility. Id. at 227. Respondent became petitioner's
supervisor in January of 1985. Id. at 227-28. In August of 1985, Petitioner
was notified that he was about to be terminated based upon his "inability to
report for duty in a dependable and reliable manner, his failure to comply with
supervisory directives, and cumulative charges of absence without approved
leave." Id. at 228. Petitioner agreed to resign rather than be terminated. Id.
In response to a potential employer's request, respondent answered that "he
could not recommend [Siegert] for privileges as a psychologist." Id. In
December of 1987, Petitioner was terminated from federal service
employment. Id. at 229. Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the adverse
reference infringed on his "'liberty interests' in violation of the protections
afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. The
Supreme Court rejected his claim. Id.
' Id. at 232. The Court stated:
[The Court of Appeals agrees with respondent that in the absence
of an allegation of malice, petitioner had stated no constitutional
claim. But it then went on to 'assume, without deciding that
[Gilley's] bad faith motivation would suffice to make [his] actions in
writing the letter a violation of Siegert's constitutional rights, and
1998
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get to the qualified immunity issue until a constitutional violation
has been found'14, which means that you cannot assume there is a
constitutional violation. I guess what the circuit courts cannot do,
the Supreme Court can, and nobody is going to tell it no.
Professor Schwartz:
The reason why the immunity issue came up that way in
Richardson is because that is what the Sixth Circuit did. 8, The
Sixth Circuit said that it was not going to decide the state action
issue, it was just going to decide the immunity issue. 186 That is
the way that the issue was presented to the United States Supreme
Court. 
Judge Pratt:
I agree with you that if there is no state action, then there is no
constitutional claim. If there is no constitutional claim, then there
is no immunity issue. If the Court had done what they said had
to be done in Siegert,88 it would have remanded the case for a
that the process given by the credentialing review was not adequate
to meet due process requirements.' (282 U.S. App. D.C., at 398,
895 F.2d at 803). We think the Court of Appeals should not have
assumed, without deciding, this preliminary issue in this case, nor
proceeded to examine the sufficiency of the allegations of malice.
Id
18 id.
185 Richardson v. McKnight, 83 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1995).
116 Id. at 425.
1s Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals holding that, "primarily for
reasons of 'public policy,' . . . the privately employed prison guards were not
entitled to the immunity provided their governmental counterparts." Id. at
4580. (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 88 F.3d at 425).
188 500 U.S. 226 (1990).
328 [Vol. 14
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/6
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
decision as to whether there was a constitutional violation and
only would then have faced the qualified immunity issue. 89
In the McMillian190 case from Alabama, the sheriff was either a
state policymaker or a municipal one. 9' In the process of
deciding that case, the Court said it they would show deference to
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of state law' because it gets
state law problems more often than does the Supreme Court. 193
Yet the Court has specifically said to circuit courts that they may
not show deference to the wisdom of the district court judge. If
in the Second Circuit you have a district court judge from
Vermont, the Supreme Court says that you cannot show any
deference to his or her interpretation of Vermont state law; the
circuit court has to interpret the law for itself. But that rule
doesn't apply to the Supreme Court. It shows deference to the
circuits, which also have similar familiarity with the local law.'
Not everything the Supreme Court does is wrong. You
commented, Marty, that, in the same case,' it was kind of
bizarre for the Supreme Court to even take the case when the
deciding issue was one of Alabama state law. It seemed to me
that one of the points the Court was trying to make was that there
is nothing unusual about having a sheriff in one state being a state
89 Id. at 226. (stating that an allegation of a violation of a "clearly
established constitutional right" must be made to "satisfy the necessary
threshold inquiry in the determination of a qualified immunity claim.")..
190 McMillian v. Monroe, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997). Petitioner was convicted
of murder. Id. at 1734. His conviction was overturned and he was released.
Id. Petitioner brought a § 1983 claim against the county and the county
sheriff, alleging that the sheriff had intimidated witnesses and suppressed
exculpatory evidence in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. The district
court dismissed the claims, and Petitioner appealed. Id. at 1734-35 The court
of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sheriff was not a policymaker for the
county, but rather for the state. Id.




'94 See McMillian, 177 S. Ct. at 1735. (stating that "[t]he court defers
considerably to the Court of Appeals' expertise in interpreting Alabama state
law.").
195 McMillian v. Monroe, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
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official and a sheriff in another state being a local official. That
broader principle is important, as you pointed out, for district
attorneys and probably for a number of other officials that have
similar labels around the country. But the guiding principle is
that you have to look to the law of the particular state.
Incidentally, they had to decide, or they thought they had to
decide, what the Alabama law was on this particular point.'9
Professor Schwartz:
The decision may be important because this issue comes up pretty
frequently. Municipal judges, for example, are they state
policymakers or local policymakers? How about district
attorneys? Second Circuit cases made the point that they are state
policymakers when they prosecute cases, but when they carry out
administrative tasks, like training, for example, they are
municipal policymakers.' 97 One thing to pay attention to in the
McMillian'98 case is that, when this issue comes up, there was a
196Id. at 1735.
1' See e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992);
Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (prosecutors are state policy
makers when deciding whether to prosecute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1514
(1988). In Walker, the plaintiff was convicted of murder based on perjured
testimony and served nineteen years in prison. Id. at 294. The City of New
York claimed that "the district attorney is a state official, and therefore that his
deliberate indifference cannot trigger municipal liability. Id. The court held
that for purposes of training, the district attorney is a municipal policy maker.
Id. See also Eisenberg v. District Attorney of County of Kings, 847 F. Supp.
1029 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). In Eisenberg, Plaintiff was charged with sexual
misconduct in the third degree. Id at 1031. During the investigation by the
District Attorney, the alleged victim's "eyewitness" made a "statement that
completely exonerated [plaintiff]." Id. The District Attorney continued the
prosecution nonetheless. Id. Plaintiff brought suit against the District
Attorney under § 1983, claiming a violation of his right to due process and
privacy under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id at
1032. The District Attorney argued that the Eleventh Amendment provides
immunity from suit. Id. at 1035. The Court agreed and further found that the
District Attorney is not entitled to immunity from suits involving
administrative acts. Id. at 1037.
'9g McMillian, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
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difference between the majority and the dissent as to those aspects
of state law that are most pertinent on this issue.'1 According to
other states do about interlocutory appeals I do not know, and I
the majority, it is important to focus on what the state constitution
says about the issue, what the highest court says about the issue,
and what the circuit court said about the issue. The majority
rejected the more pragmatic approach taken by the dissent.2'
Judge Pratt:
One final comment on the Johnson1 case - the interlocutory
appeal. There is nothing in Section 1983, according to the
Supreme Court, that says that the states must have an
interlocutory appeal available for a denial of qualified immunity.
That is significant because it is the first time, as Marty pointed
out, that the Supreme Court has said that there can be a
difference between how these cases should be handled in state and
federal court. It is not a very significant difference. Certainly
for New York, the interlocutory appeal is there. You can appeal
almost anything to the Appellate Division in New York. Forty
states now have adopted the Federal Rules and its final judgment
rule," and almost all of them follow the Supreme Court's
' Id. The dissent by Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Sourer
and Breyer concludes that a sheriff is a municipal policynaker by looking at
the electoral process, payment of salary, equipment, implementation of policy
and geographic confines. The majority, on the other hand, defers to the circuit
court's reliance upon the Alabama Constitution. Id.
2MId. at 1740.
"' Johnson v. Frankel, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997).
2m See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This section provides in pertinent part:
The Court of Appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be
had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the
jurisdiction described in §§ 1292 (c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.")
1998
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interpretation of it. So in almost all of those states they would
have the same qualified immunity appeal available. What the do
not particularly care. But in New York it has no significance at
all because it was available anyway.
Professor William E. Hellerstein:
Marty, on the issue of state action in the privatization case, it
may well be that the Sixth Circuit decided the qualified immunity
issue and did not address it.m But my reading of the case is that
the Court assumed arguendo, without deciding, that it is not
conceivable that privatization of prisons would result in a decision
that it is not state action. I gave that on my Constitutional Law
exam this year. I considered it, as I told my students that came in
to review their exam, a "gimme." How could you miss it? Of
course it is state action. They missed discussing the issue. Those
who saw the issue said of course it is state action, no matter how
you put it. Could it be otherwise?
Professor Schwartz:
I would have thought not, prior to Richardson. I would have
thought that there has to be a finding of state action. But let me
add a wrinkle to this. When you talk about state action theories
in the Supreme Court and how they play out with private prisons,
what is the most likely state action theory? One, I think, would
say the public function theory. 24 Of all of the theories, that is the
most likely for state action in this context.
203 See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
204 See Maura L. Demouy, Employment Law: Exploring the Boundaries of
Section 1983 and Title VII, 54 M.D.L.R. 942 (1995).
In order to become a "state actor," the public function doctrine
requires that private actors must both serve a public function and
perform a traditionally exclusive responsibility of the state. Because
courts have found it difficult to determine when the public function
doctrine applies, the public function doctrine has created liability only in
a small category of cases.
332 [Vol. 14
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Except for Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,10 the
beneficial, intertwining, synchronicity, symbiotic relationship
seems to me to be when the city is able to "dish off", as they say
in basketball terms, its responsibility for a prison. Usually this is
because it makes fiscal sense to do so, and it strikes me as
coming fairly close to the Burton line of cases? 5
Professor Schwartz:
One problem now with the public function doctrine is that the
Supreme Court modem public function decisions state that to
come within the doctrine, the function has to be not only a
traditional governmental function, but also must be historically an
excessively governmental function.z That exclusivity is the
aspect that is typically very hard to satisfy. I know too well,
because I lost a case in Supreme Court on this issue.m So when
you are talking "conceivable," you are probably talking to the
205 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Appellant was refused service at a restaurant
located in a publicly- owned and operated building solely because he was a
Negro. Id. at 715. Appellant brought suit against the restaurant and the state
agency from which the restaurant was leased, claiming a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court of
Delaware held that the appellant was not entitled to relief. Id. Appellant
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the "state statute
had been construed unconstitutionally. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that "when a State leases public property in the manner and
for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the proscriptions of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as certainly as
though they were binding covenants written into the agreement itself." Id. at
726.
1 Id. See, e.g. Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1957); City
of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (C.A. 4 th Cir. 1957); Derrington v.
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1957).
' See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (stating that
"while many functions have been traditionally performed by governments,
very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the state.").
208 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
1998
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wrong person. What is interesting in Richardson°9 is that the
Court, in discussing the immunity issue, said that private prisons
have been part of the history of this country. °10 The Court said
that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were a good
number of private prisons in this country which, in terms of
public function doctrine, could lead the Court to say history
shows otherwise. 21' This is not one of those exclusively
governmental functions.
In terms of the Burton symbiotic relationship test,212 I think that
test is basically a dead letter as far as the United States Supreme
Court is concerned. The Court has, in case after case, found
reasons to distinguish Burton2l3 whenever it has been asserted to
support state action. The point that one has to wonder about is
that, even if you had a plaintiff named "Burton" and a restaurant
called the "Eagle Restaurant," would the Supreme Court find
state action under those facts? I don't know.
I do think that there are some idiosyncratic situations, and this
may be one of them, where the Supreme Court would not utilize
a state action doctrine like "public function" or "symbiotic
relationship." Rather, it probably would rely on West v.
Atkins,1 which is a case holding that private physicians who
I Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
210 Id at 2104.
211 Id.
212 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).
213 Id.
214 487 U.S. 42 (1987). Respondent was a private physician under contract to
provide orthopedic services at a North Carolina prison. Id. at 42. Petitioner,
injured in the prison, was "barred by state law from employing or electing to
see a physician of his own choosing." Id. Petitioner brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a violation of his "Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment." Id. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the respondent, holding that, "as a 'contract physician,'
respondent was not acting 'under color of state law,' a jurisdictional
prerequisite for a § 1983 action. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. Tie
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding "a physician
who is under contract with the State to provide medical services to inmates at a
state-prison hospital on a part-time basis acts 'under color of state law,' within
the meaning of § 1983, when he treats an inmate." Id.
334 [Vol. 14
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provide services to prisoners are engaged in state action. It is not
a sound decision in terms of state action doctrine and analysis.
It's a decision that is all over the place, but it is a unanimous
decision and makes sense in terms of the result. I think that it
probably would be utilized by the Court to support the conclusion
that private prison guards are engaged in state action.
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